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Stochastic Games for Security in Networks with Interdependent Nodes
Kien C. Nguyen, Tansu Alpcan, and Tamer Bas¸ar
Abstract— This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic
approach to security and intrusion detection in communication
and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender
take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes
whose security assets and vulnerabilities are correlated. Such a
network can be modeled using weighted directed graphs with
the edges representing the influence among the nodes. The game
can be formulated as a non-cooperative zero-sum or nonzero-
sum stochastic game. However, due to correlation among the
nodes, if some nodes are compromised, the effective security
assets and vulnerabilities of the remaining ones will not stay
the same in general, which leads to complex system dynamics.
We examine existence, uniqueness, and structure of the solution
and also provide numerical examples to illustrate our model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, as computer networks become ubiquitous, network
security and intrusion detection (ID) play a more and more
important role. The main task of an intrusion detection sys-
tem (IDS) is to detect intrusions and report them to a system
administrator. Among various approaches, non-cooperative
game theory has recently been employed extensively to study
ID problems [1]–[6].
In a general setting, a security game is defined between
two players: an Attacker and a Defender (the IDS). A
formulation of security games as static games can be found
in [1]. In [3], the authors consider security games with
imperfect observations and use the finite-state Markov chain
framework to analyze such games. The work in [4] employs
the framework of Bayesian games to address the intrusion
detection problem in wireless ad hoc networks, where a
mobile node viewed as a player confronts an opponent whose
type is unknown.
In [5], the author examines the intrusion detection problem
in heterogenous networks as a nonzero-sum static game. In
a complex network, nodes are of different levels of impor-
tance to the Defender, and also appear variably attractive
to the Attacker. Heterogeneity also stems from hierarchy
and correlation among nodes. It is thus essential to consider
scenarios where nodes have different security assets. Also,
apart from a node’s security asset, if we take into account
the players’ motivations, the cost of attacking, the cost of
monitoring, and other factors, the game is no longer a zero-
sum one. Using the Nash Equilibrium (NE) solution concept,
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the analysis allows one to compute the Attacker’s optimal
strategy as a probability mass distribution on the nodes
to attack. Similarly, the Defender’s optimal strategy is a
probability mass distribution on the nodes to monitor (to
collect and process data and detect attacks). However, in
this work [5], the security assets are still assumed to be
independent. Also, the dynamics of the ID problem when
nodes are compromised along the play have not been taken
into account.
The work in [6] addresses this problem using the frame-
work of zero-sum stochastic games [8]. The network is now
modeled as a discrete-time or continuous-time Markov chain
where the network states are defined by the states (com-
promised or not) of the constituent nodes. This formulation
thus takes into account the dynamics of the problem and
allows one to incorporate correlation among nodes in terms
of vulnerability. The analysis is nonetheless limited to zero-
sum games and again, the security assets are considered to
be independent.
This paper attempts to extend these earlier works to con-
struct a more comprehensive network security and intrusion
detection model. We develop a network model based on
linear influence networks proposed in [7]. This model, when
used under the framework of stochastic games, permits us to
take into consideration the correlation among the nodes in
terms of both security assets and vulnerabilities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the
remaining part of this section, we summarize the notations
and variables used throughout this paper. Next, in Section
II, we introduce two linear influence network models for
security assets and vulnerabilities. In Section III, we formu-
late the security game based on these models as a zero-sum
stochastic game and present results on existence, uniqueness,
and structure of the solution. We then provide a numerical
example in Section IV. Finally, some concluding remarks of
Section V end the paper.
Summary of notations and variables used in this paper
• N : Set of nodes in the network.
• n: Number of nodes in the network.
• Es: Set of edges representing the influence among node
security assets.
• Ev: Set of edges representing the influence among node
vulnerabilities.
• ei j: A directed edge from node i to node j, ei j ∈ Es or
ei j ∈ Ev.
• Gs: Weighted directed graph for node security assets,
Gs = {N ,Es}
• Gv: Weighted directed graph for node vulnerabilities,
Gv = {N ,Ev}
• I, Ii j: Influence matrix for security assets and its entries.
• wi j: Influence of node i on node j in terms of security
assets, where i, j ∈N
• s = {s1,s2, . . . ,sn}: Vector of independent security as-
sets.
• x = {x1,x2, . . . ,xn}: Vector of effective security assets.
• H, hi j: Support matrix and its entries, hi j signifies the
support that node i gives node j (against attacks), 0 ≤
hi j ≤ 1 ∀i, j ∈N .
• h j: Support to node j, j ∈N , h j = ∑ni=1 hi j.
• p jn1: Probability that node j is compromised when player
1 (the Attacker) attacks, player 2 (the Defender) does
not defend the node, and the support to node j is equal
to 1 (full support).
• p jn0: Probability that node j is compromised when the
Attacker attacks, the Defender does not defend the node,
and the support to node j is equal to 0 (no support).
• p jd1: Probability that node j is compromised when the
Attacker attacks, the Defender defends the node, and
the support to node j is equal to 1 (full support).
• p jd0: Probability that node j is compromised when the
Attacker attacks, the Defender defends the node, and
the support to node j is equal to 0 (no support).
•
{
S1,S2, . . .Sp
}
: States in the state space of the system.
•
{
Γ1,Γ2, . . .Γp
}
: Game elements of the stochastic game,
each of which corresponds to a state of the system.
• pkr : Probability that the network goes back to state S1,
given that it is currently in state Sk, the Attacker attacks
one node and the attack fails.
• pke: Probability that the game ends given that it is
currently in state Sk, the Attacker attacks one node and
the attack fails.
• pk/0r: Probability that the network goes back to state S1,
given that it is currently in state Sk and the Attacker
does not attack any node.
• pk/0e: Probability that the game ends given that it is
currently in state Sk and the Attacker does not attack
any node.
• aki j: Instant amount that player 2 pays player 1 at game
element Γk, if player 1 plays pure strategy i and player
2 plays pure strategy j.
• qkli j : Probability that both players have to play game
element Γl next, given that they are currently at game
element Γk, if player 1 plays pure strategy i and player
2 plays pure strategy j.
• qk0i j : Probability that the game ends given that they are
currently at game element Γk, if player 1 plays pure
strategy i and player 2 plays pure strategy j.
• mk: Number of pure strategies for player 1 at game
element Γk.
• nk: Number of pure strategies for player 2 at game
element Γk.
• p (p = 2n): Number of game elements of the stochastic
game, or the number of states of the state space.
• αki j: A collective entry that includes the instant payoff
and the transition probabilities to all game elements,
αki j = a
k
i j +∑pl=1 qkli jΓl , given that the players are cur-
rently at game element Γk, player 1 plays pure strategy
i, and player 2 plays pure strategy j.
• bki j: Value of αki j when we replace game elements Γl’s
with their values. bki j = aki j +∑pl=1 qkli jvl .
• ykti : Probability that player 1 plays pure strategy i when
playing game element Γk at the t-th stage of the game.
For stationary strategies [8], the superscript t will be
omitted.
• zktj : Probability that player 2 plays pure strategy j when
playing game element Γk at the t-th stage of the game.
• ykt , (k = 1, . . . , p, t = 1,2, . . .): Strategy for player 1, a
set of mk-vectors each of which is a mixed strategy of
player 1 at game element Γk and t-th stage of the game.
• zkt , (k = 1, . . . , p, t = 1,2, . . .): Strategy for player 2, a
set of nk-vectors each of which is a mixed strategy of
player 2 at game element Γk and t-th stage of the game.
• cki : Pure strategy i for the Attacker at game element Γk.
• dkj : Pure strategy j for the Defender at game element
Γk.
• pks(cki ,dkj ): Probability that the attack is successful given
that the Attacker plays pure strategy cki and the Defender
plays pure strategy dkj at game element Γk.
• v = (v1,v2, . . . ,vp): Value vector of the stochastic game.
• val(B): Value of the zero-sum matrix game given by the
matrix B.
II. LINEAR INFLUENCE NETWORK MODELS FOR
SECURITY ASSETS AND FOR VULNERABILITIES
We present in this section a network model based on the
concept of linear influence networks [7]. The network will be
represented by two weighted directed graphs, one signifying
the relationship of security assets and the other denoting
vulnerability correlation among the nodes.
A. Linear influence network model for security assets
For a particular node, the general term security asset is
used to signify how important the node is to the network.
All the security assets of a network can be modeled as a
weighted directed graph Gs = {N ,Es} where N is the set
of nodes, and the elements of set Es represent the influence
among the nodes. Let n be the cardinality of N . For each
edge ei j ∈ Es, we denote an associated scalar wi j that signifies
the influence of node i on node j, where i, j ∈N . The entries
of the influence matrix I are then given as follows:
Ii j =
{
wi j if ei j ∈ Es
0 otherwise, (1)
where 0 < wi j ≤ 1 ∀i, j ∈ N and ∑ni=1 wi j = 1, ∀ j ∈ N .
Note that here we allow for the edges of the form w j j =
1−∑ni=1,i6= j wi j , which signifies the portion of influence of a
node on the independent security asset of itself.
Let s = {s1,s2, . . . ,sn} be the vector of independent secu-
rity assets. The vector of effective security assets, denoted
by x = {x1,x2, . . . ,xn} can then be computed by the influence
equation:
x = Is. (2)
With the condition ∑ni=1 wi j = 1,∀ j =∈N , we have that
n
∑
i=1
xi =
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
wi js j =
n
∑
j=1
n
∑
i=1
wi js j
=
n
∑
j=1
s j
n
∑
i=1
wi j =
n
∑
j=1
s j. (3)
Therefore, the sum of all the effective security assets is
equal to the sum of all the independent security assets.
The influence matrix thus signifies the redistribution of
security assets. The independent security asset of a node i
is redistributed to all the nodes in the network that have
influence on i (including itself). When a node is down, the
node itself and all the edges connected to it will be removed
from the graph. Thus the security loss of the network will be
the node’s effective security asset (instead of its independent
security asset). Conversely, if a node is brought back to the
network, it regains its original influence on other nodes. In
either case, the entries of the influence matrix have to be
normalized to satisfy ∑ni=1 wi j = 1, ∀ j ∈ N . For a quick
justification of this linear influence model, consider a GSM
network, where a base station controller (BSC) i controls
several base transceiver stations (BTS), including BTS j. If
a BSC fails, all the BTSs connected to it will be out of
service. On the contrary, if only one BTS is compromised,
the communication among the subscribers under other BTSs
should not be affected (provided that the rest of the network
is up and running). In such a situation, we can have for
example, w j j = 0.7 and wi j = 0.3. If the BSC is down, there
is still an amount of security asset 0.7s j left, even though
the BTS is not in service anymore. The reason is that, if this
BTS gets connected to another BSC (or if the original BSC
is up again), they will together create an added security asset
for the network. We present in what follows an example to
illustrate the linear influence network model.
PSfrag replacements
1
2
3
1 2
3
0.9
0.2
0.1
0.7
1/8
7/8
w32
w12
w31
w33
w22w11
Fig. 1. A linear influence network for security assets of a three-node
network.
Example 1: Suppose that we have a network of three
nodes with correlations as shown in Fig. 1. As shown in Fig.
2, the states of the system are given as
{
S1,S2, . . .Sp
}
(p =
2n) where Sk ∈ {0,1}n , k = 1, . . . , p. Here a node is said
to be in state 1 if it is compromised and 0 otherwise. Note
that we consider a discrete-time Markov chain where the
system can transit from one state to any state of the state
space (including the original state). The influence equation
(1,1,1)
(0,0,0)
(1,0,0)
(0,0,1)
(1,1,0)
(0,1,1) (0,1,0)
(1,0,1)
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Fig. 2. An example state diagram for the network in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 3. Changes in a linear influence network for security assets when
nodes are compromised (Example 1).
(2) can be written as:
 x
(1)
1
x
(1)
2
x
(1)
3

 =

 0.9 0.2 00 0.7 0
0.1 0.1 1



 s
(1)
1
s
(1)
2
s
(1)
3

 (4)
Now suppose that node 1 is compromised; then the in-
dependent security asset of node 3 will remain the same,
s
(2)
3 = s
(1)
3 . The independent security asset of node 2 will
be decreased by an amount corresponding to the influence
of node 1 on node 2: s(2)2 = s
(1)
2 − 0.2s
(1)
2 = 0.8s
(1)
2 . Also,
the influences on each node have to be normalized to have
∑i wi j = 1. Thus we now have w32 = 1/8 and w22 = 7/8, and
the influence equation becomes(
x
(2)
2
x
(2)
3
)
=
(
7/8 0
1/8 1
)(
s
(2)
2
s
(2)
3
)
(5)
Thus we can see
x
(2)
2 = (7/8)s
(2)
2 = 0.7s
(1)
2 ,
x
(2)
3 = (1/8)s
(2)
2 + s
(2)
3 = 0.1s
(1)
2 + s
(1)
3 .
After node 1 goes down, the effective security asset of
node 2 remains the same, while that of node 3 is decreased
by an amount representing its influence on node 1.
Now if node 3 is in turn compromised, we have a network
with one node as in Fig. 3. We have
s
(3)
2 = s
(2)
2 − s
(2)
2 /8 = (7/8)s
(2)
2 = 0.7s
(1)
2 ,
x
(3)
2 = s
(3)
2 .
B. Linear influence network model for vulnerabilities
In this subsection, we use the linear influence network
model to represent the correlation of node vulnerabilities in
a network. Beside the correlation of security assets, nodes
also have influence on others’ vulnerabilities. For example,
within a corporate network, if a workstation is compromised,
the data stored in this computer can be exploited in attacks
against other workstations; these latter computers thus will
become more vulnerable to intrusion. Under the framework
of stochastic games, this kind of influence is readily incor-
porated. For instance, in the network of Example 1, if the
Attacker attacks node 1, and the Defender decides not to
defend this node, the probability that the system goes from
(0,1,0) to (1,1,0) will be greater that the probability that
the system goes from (0,0,0) to (1,0,0), if node 2 has some
influence on node 1 in terms of vulnerability. For ei j ∈ Ev,
we define the support matrix as follows
H =
{
hi j if ei j ∈ Ev
0 otherwise, (6)
where hi j signifies the support that node i gives node j
(against attacks), 0≤ hi j ≤ 1 ∀i, j ∈N . The support to node
j, j ∈N is defined as
h j =
n
∑
i=1
hi j, (7)
where 0 ≤ h j ≤ 1, ∀ j ∈ N . Unlike the model for security
assets, here we do not normalize h j. When a node that
supports node j is down, h j will decrease, and thus the
probability that node j is compromised under attack will
increase. Let us denote by p js the probability that node j is
compromised at each state. We assume an affine relationship
between p js and h j as follows:
• If node j is not attacked then p js = 0.
• If node j is attacked, and the Defender is not defending
this node, p js = p jn0− (p
j
n0− p
j
n1)h j, where p
j
n1 and p
j
n0
are the probabilities that the node is compromised given
that the support is equal to 1 (full support) and 0 (no
support), respectively (p jn1 < p jn0).
• If node j is attacked, and the Defender is defending this
node, p js = p jd0− (p
j
d0− p
j
d1)h j, where p
j
d1 and p
j
d0 are
the probabilities that the node is compromised given that
the support is equal to 1 and 0, respectively (p jd1 < p jd0).
• Also, it is assumed that p jd1 < p
j
n1 and p
j
d0 < p
j
n0.
A weighted directed graph for network vulnerabilities is
shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4. A linear influence network for vulnerabilities and the changes of
supports when one node is compromised.
III. THE NETWORK SECURITY PROBLEM AS A
ZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC GAME
A. A brief overview of zero-sum stochastic games
In this subsection, we provide a brief overview of zero-
sum stochastic games based on [8]. A stochastic game
consists of p game elements Γk, k = 1, . . . , p. Each game
element is associated with an mk×nk matrix, whose entries
are given by
αki j = a
k
i j +
p
∑
l=1
qkli jΓl , (8)
where qkli j ≥ 0, l = 1, . . . , p, i = 1, . . . ,mk, j = 1, . . . ,nk,
p
∑
l=1
qkli j < 1, ∀k, i, j. (9)
Expression (8) can be interpreted as follows. At game
element Γk, if player 1 chooses pure strategy i and player
2 chooses pure strategy j, player 2 has to pay player 1 an
amount aki j. Furthermore, there is a probability qkli j that both
players have to play game element Γl next, and a probability
qk0i j = 1−
p
∑
l=1
qkli j (10)
that the game will end. With condition (9), the probability
of infinite play is guaranteed to be zero, and the expected
payoff of player 1 (or the expected loss of player 2), which
is accumulated through all the stages of the game, is finite
[8].
A strategy for player 1 is a set of mk-vectors, denoted by
ykt , k = 1, . . . , p, t = 1,2, . . ., each of which satisfies
mk∑
i=1
ykti = 1, (11)
ykti ≥ 0 (12)
Here ykti is the probability that player 1 plays pure strategy
i if he is playing game element Γk at the t-th stage of the
game. A strategy is said to be stationary if the vectors ykt
are independent of t for all k. In this case, the superscript t
can be omitted. Similarly, a strategy for player 2 is a set of
nk-vectors, zkt , where ∑nkj=1 zktj = 1 and zktj ≥ 0. Given a pair
of strategies, we can compute the vector of expected payoffs
v = (v1,v2, . . . ,vp), where vk, k = 1, . . . , p is the expected
payoff (to player 1) if the first stage of the game is Γk.
With the above settings, it is known [8], that we can
replace the game element Γk by the value component
vk = val(Bk), (13)
where val(Bk) is the value (in mixed strategies) of the matrix
game Bk, and Bk is the mk×nk matrix whose entries are given
by
bki j = aki j +
p
∑
l=1
qkli jvl . (14)
B. A zero-sum stochastic game model for network security
In this subsection we formulate the security problem as a
zero-sum stochastic game. This is a modified version of the
game presented in [6], applied to the linear influence network
model proposed in Section II. At each state k, k = 1, . . . , p,
the Attacker’s pure strategies consist of mk = n+ 1 actions,
where n is the number of nodes in the network:
• Attack one of n nodes, cki , where i = 1, . . . ,n.
• Do nothing, ckmk = /0.
Note that this strategy space is for use with more general
payoff formulations. However, with the payoff formulation
in this paper, the Attacker will not have motivation to attack
a node that is already compromised, unless all the nodes
have been compromised. For each k, the Defender’s pure
strategies are
{
dki
}
, where
• Defend node i, dki , i = 1, . . . ,nk− 1,
• Do nothing, dknk = /0,
where nk =mk = n+1. For each possible combination of the
Attacker’s and the Defender’s pure strategies, the entries of
the payoff matrix are:
αki j = a
k
i j +
p
∑
l=1
qkli jΓl , (15)
where aki j = pks(cki ,dkj )xk(i), pks(cki ,dkj ) is the probability that
the attack is successful, and xk(i) is the effective security
asset of the node being attacked, i. Note that once a node
is compromised, the effective security assets and the sup-
ports of the remaining nodes have to be recalculated as in
Example 1 and Fig. 4. As mentioned in Subsection II-B,
the probabilities pks , and thus qkli j , are dependent on the
supports to the nodes, and are therefore affected by the
correlation in vulnerabilities of the nodes. It can be said
that once we have incorporated node vulnerabilities into
our model, we have already implicitly taken care of the
cost of attacking/defending. For example, if a node is of
high security asset but difficult to compromise (the transition
probability to the compromise state is small), the Attacker
may turn to another node with a smaller security asset, which
is easier to attack.
At a state Sk, if the Attacker chooses to attack one node
and the attack fails, there is a probability pkr ∈ (0,1) that
the network will go back to state S1 (which means the
Defender has detected the Attacker and managed to restore
all the compromised nodes and the game restarts at S1),
and a probability pke ∈ (0,1) that the game will end (which
means the Defender has detected the Attacker and stopped
him from further intruding). Note that pkr + pke ≤ 1 with
equality only when Sk = S1(0,0, . . . ,0). Similarly, at one
point, if the Attacker chooses not to attack at all, there is
a probability pk/0r ∈ (0,1) that the network will go back to
state S1, and a probability pk/0e ∈ (0,1) that the game will
end. Given 0< p jd1, p
j
n1, p
j
d0, p
j
n0 < 1, j ∈N , pkr , pke, pk/0r,
and pk/0e, k = 1, . . . , p, and the support matrix H, pks and qkli j
can be calculated using the equations in Subsection II-B. A
numerical example is shown in Section IV.
C. Existence, uniqueness, and structure of the solution
We present in this subsection some analytical results for
the game given in III-B, based on zero-sum stochastic game
theory [8], [9].
Proposition 1: In the zero-sum stochastic game given in
III-B, the probability of infinite play is zero and the expected
payoff of the Attacker (which is also the expected cost of
the Defender) is finite.
With the setup in III-B, we can show that qk0i j = 1−∑pl=1 qkli j >
0, ∀k and ∀ i, j of each game element Γk. Thus the propo-
sition is proved using the theory of stochastic games.
Proposition 2: (Theorem V.3.3 [8]) In the zero-sum
stochastic game given in III-B, there exists exactly one vector
v = (v1,v2, . . . ,vp) that satisfies (13) and (14).
Using the results from III-A, we can then compute the NE
of the game, which is a pair of stationary mixed strategies
for the Attacker and for the Defender at each state.
Proposition 3: (Theorem V.3.3 [8]) The vector v =
(v1,v2, . . . ,vp) that satisfies (13) and (14) can be derived
through the following recursive equations:
v0 = (0,0, . . . ,0), (16)
bkri j = aki j +
p
∑
l=1
qkli jv
r
l , (17)
vr+1k = val(B
r
k) = val(bkri j ). (18)
We can stop the recursion at a desired level of accuracy and
then use the current value of vector v = (v1,v2, . . . ,vp) to
compute Bk using (14). The mixed strategies of the players
at each game element Γk are the NE in mixed strategies of
the matrix game Bk. The strategies so obtained will converge
to optimal stationary strategies of the stochastic game.
IV. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we implement numerical simulation for
a specific network with three nodes. The setup in III-B
is carried over with some further assumptions as follows.
First, we adopt a simplified state diagram as given in Fig. 1.
Basically, after each time step, we only allow for transitions
where one more node is compromised, the transition that
returns to the same state, and the transition back to S1(0,0,0).
Second, suppose that the influence equation is given as
follows (Example 1)
 x
(1)
1
x
(1)
2
x
(1)
3

=

 0.9 0.2 00 0.7 0
0.1 0.1 1



 1010
20

=

 117
22

 ,
(19)
and the support matrix is given by (Fig. 4)
H =

 0.7 0 00.2 0.5 0
0.1 0.3 0.9

 . (20)
Finally, p jd1 = 0.2, p
j
n1 = 0.4, p
j
d0 = 0.5, p
j
n0 = 0.7,∀ j ∈N ,
pkr = 0.2, ∀k 6= 1, p1r = 0.7, pke = 0.3, ∀k = 1, . . . , p, pk/0r =
0.2, ∀k 6= 1, p1/0r = 0.7, and pk/0e = 0.3, ∀k = 1, . . . , p.
For example, suppose the system is at
S1 (0,0,0). The next state could be one in
{S1 (0,0,0), S2 (0,0,1), S3 (0,1,0), S5 (1,0,0)}.
The Attacker’s pure strategies include 1,2,3, and /0, which
mean to attack node 1, node 2, node 3, and do nothing,
respectively. Similarly, the Defender’s pure strategies include
1,2,3, and /0. Using the above results, we have that
a111 = p
1
s (1,1)x
(1)
1 ,
q1111 = (1− p1s(1,1))(1− p1e),
q1511 = p
1
s (1,1),
q1 j11 = 0 ∀ j 6= 1,5,
where p1s (1,1) = pd0− (pd0 − pd1)1 = pd1, as at this state,
node 1 still has full support. Also, there is a probability p1eg =
(1− p1s(1,1))p1e > 0 that the game will end. If the Attacker
attacks node 1 and the Defender defends node 2, we have
that
a112 = p
1
s (1,2)x
(1)
1 ,
q1112 = (1− p1s(1,2))(1− p1e),
q1512 = p
1
s (1,2),
q1 j12 = 0 ∀ j 6= 1,5,
where p1s (1,1) = pn0 − (pn0 − pn1)1 = pn1, again as at this
state, node 1 still has full support. Also, there is a probability
p1eg = (1− p1s (1,2))p1e > 0 that the game will end. Now,
suppose that the system is at S5 (1,0,0). The next state could
be one in {S1 (0,0,0), S5 (1,0,0), S6 (1,0,1), S7 (1,1,0)}.
The Attacker’s pure strategies include 2,3, and /0, which
mean to attack node 2, node 3, and do nothing, respectively.
Similarly, the Defender’s pure strategies include 2,3, and /0.
Now we have that
a522 = p
2
s (2,2)x
(5)
2 ,
q5722 = p
2
s (2,2),
q5122 = (1− p2s(2,2))p5r ,
q5522 = (1− p2s(2,2))(1− p5r − p5e),
q5 j22 = 0 ∀ j 6= 1,5,7,
where p2s (2,2) = p2d0− (p2d0− p2d1)0.8, as at this state, node
2 has a support of 0.8. Also, there is a probability p5eg =
GE Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Do nothing
1 (0,0,0) 0.6126 0 0.3874 0
2 (0,0,1) 0.3817 0.6183 0 0
3 (0,1,0) 0.6415 0 0.3585 0
4 (0,1,1) 1 0 0 0
5 (1,0,0) 0 0.6568 0.3432 0
6 (1,0,1) 0 1 0 0
7 (1,1,0) 0 0 1 0
8 (1,1,1) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
TABLE I
OPTIMAL STRATEGIES FOR THE ATTACKER AT EACH GAME ELEMENT
(GE).
GE Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Do nothing
1 (0,0,0) 0.0702 0 0.9298 0
2 (0,0,1) 0.6614 0.3386 0 0
3 (0,1,0) 0.0869 0 0.9131 0
4 (0,1,1) 1 0 0 0
5 (1,0,0) 0 0.034 0.966 0
6 (1,0,1) 0 1 0 0
7 (1,1,0) 0 0 1 0
8 (1,1,1) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
TABLE II
OPTIMAL STRATEGIES FOR THE DEFENDER AT EACH GAME ELEMENT.
(1− p2s (2,2))p5e > 0 that the game will end. The other entries
of other game elements can be calculated in a similar way.
Using the recursive procedure given in Proposition 3, we
can then compute the optimal strategy of each player and
the value of the game. The value vector converges to an
accuracy of 10−4 after 56 iterations. The optimal strategies
of the Attacker and the Defender, and the value vector are
given in Tables I, III, and III. As can be seen from Table
I, for example, when all the nodes are up and running, the
Attacker wants to attack node 1 with probability 0.6126 and
node 3 with probability 0.3874, while the Defender wants
to defend node 1 with probability 0.0702 and node 3 with
probability 0.9298. Recall that the effective security assets of
nodes 1, 2, and 3 at this state are 11, 7, and 22, respectively.
It is worth noting that the mixed strategies for the players
can also be interpreted as the way to allocate their resources
in the security game.
GE 1 2 3 4
Payoffs 19.6078 15.8301 17.9557 12.3392
GE 5 6 7 8
Payoffs 17.9659 13.0283 15.3228 7.8431
TABLE III
THE VALUE VECTOR (THE EXPECTED PAYOFFS OF THE ATTACKER, ALSO
THE EXPECTED LOSSES OF THE DEFENDER AT EACH GAME ELEMENT).
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed a new network model
based on linear influence networks to represent the inter-
dependence of nodes in terms of security assets and vul-
nerabilities. We took the first step to formulate the security
game between an Attacker and a Defender over this network
using the framework of zero-sum stochastic game theory.
The optimal solution obtained allows one to comprehend the
behavior of a rational attacker, as well as to provide IDSs
with guidelines on how to allocate their resources. Moreover,
modeling networks with linear influence network models
helps facilitate solving the security games using software
programs. As mentioned earlier, apart from a node’s security
asset, if we take into account the players’ motivations, the
cost of attacking, the cost of monitoring, and other factors,
the game is no longer a zero-sum one. This work thus can
be extended to nonzero-sum stochastic games, where we
can address more flexible and practical payoff formulations.
Furthermore, in many real-world scenarios, neither the At-
tacker nor the Defender has full knowledge of the network’s
nodes and their correlation. Thus studying stochastic security
games with incomplete information is an intriguing research
direction.
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